Interpretations of Einstein's equation differ primarily concerning whether E = mc 2 entails that mass and energy are the same property of physical systems, and hence whether there is any sense in which mass is ever "converted" into energy (or vice versa). In this paper, I examine six interpretations of Einstein's equation and argue that all but one fail to satisfy a minimal set of conditions that all interpretations of physical theories ought to satisfy. I argue that we should prefer the interpretation of Einstein's equation that holds that mass and energy are distinct properties of physical systems. This interpretation also carries along the view that while most cases of "conversion" are not genuine examples of mass being "converted" into energy (or vice versa), it is possible that the there are such "conversions" in the sense that a certain amount of mass "appears" and an equivalent of mass "disappears." Finally, I suggest that the interpretation I defend is the only one that does not blur the distinction between what Einstein called "principle" and "constructive" theories. This is philosophically significant because it emphasizes that explanations of Einstein's equation and the "conversion" of mass and energy must be top-down explanations.
understand purported "conversions" of mass and energy. So, for example, Bondi and Spurgin (1987) have argued that while we are not entitled to infer from Einstein's equation that mass and energy are the same property, there is no sense in which mass is ever "converted" into energy (or vice versa).
My purpose here is to argue for the interpretation of Einstein's equation that holds that mass and energy are distinct properties of physical systems and that it is possible that there are cases where mass is converted into energy in the sense that a certain amount of mass "disappears" and an equivalent amount of energy "appears" (or vice versa). I reach this conclusion by first showing that all of the leading and influential interpretations of Einstein's equation in the literature (which I describe in Section II), except the one I favor, fail to satisfy three minimal constraints on interpretations of physical theories. The first requirement I impose is simply the familiar one that that an interpretation I of a theory T should tell us what the world is like if T is true. I then impose the two additional requirements that I should not appeal to hypotheses outside T, and that I should interpret the mathematical formalism of T uniformly (see Section III). I argue that Lange's (2001 Lange's ( , 2002 because they assume hypotheses concerning the nature of matter that lie outside special relativity (Section IV). Finally, I suggest that the latter failure is significant because it involves us in the quest for bottom-up type explanations of E = mc 2 and the "conversion" of mass and energy. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Flores, 1999) , special relativity is a principle theory and principle theories only offer top-down explanations (Section V). I begin (in Section I) with some preliminary remarks outlining my assumptions for this paper.
I. Preliminaries
My main assumptions throughout this paper concern the notions of mass in Newtonian and relativistic physics. I will assume that in Newtonian physics one can define inertial mass as a measure of how a body responds to changes in velocity and that inertial mass can be measured dynamically along the lines first suggested by Maxwell and Mach. In the context of special relativity, I will assume that the rest-mass of a body is a measure of its inertia. Thus, I will assume that rest-mass is the closest analogue in relativistic physics of Newtonian inertial mass despite important differences concerning how instances of rest-mass combine arithmetically.
The philosophical significance of these assumptions is that I shall not discuss interpretations of Einstein's equation that claim that matter is convertible into energy (or vice versa). Such interpretations, though common in popular expositions of Einstein's equation, rest at best on a mistaken adherence to Newton's notion of mass as a measure of the quantity of matter, which Maxwell, Mach, and others correctly criticized. At worst, such interpretations either assume that energy is a type of substance, which is also untenable for well-known reasons, or make a type of category mistake. Einstein I will also assume the familiar distinction between relativistic mass and rest-mass, though I will focus exclusively on the latter especially because the most philosophically interesting and challenging consequences of Einstein's equation concern the equality (in units in which c = 1) of rest-energy and rest-mass. I will follow the common practice of dropping the adjective "rest" from "rest-mass" unless ambiguity threatens. From now on, then, I will use the equation E = mc 2 to designate the numerical equivalence of restenergy and rest-mass, which I will simply call "mass-energy equivalence." Thus, I will not use Einstein's equation to designate, as it usually does, the numerical equivalence of the total relativistic energy and relativistic mass.
Finally, I will assume the familiar "geometric" or "co-variant" formulation of special relativity. On this view, the mass of a body is represented within the mathematical formalism as the magnitude of that body's four-momentum. The restenergy, as it is called in presentations of relativity that emphasize coordinate transformations, is then simply a scalar multiple of a scalar invariant.
II. Interpretations of Einstein's Equation
There are six interpretations of Einstein's equation I wish to consider. All of these interpretations treat mass and energy as properties of physical systems. Four of these interpretations, which I will call property interpretations, confine their claims to the question of whether mass and energy are the same property, and whether there is a concrete sense in which mass and energy are "convertible." The other two interpretations I consider, which I will call ontological interpretations, take the additional step of drawing a further conclusion concerning the fundamental stuff of modern physics from mass-energy equivalence. The two types of interpretations are closely related. As I shall presently show, the ontological interpretations I consider are based on a particular type of property interpretation, which claims that mass and energy are the same property. My goal in this section is to describe each interpretation of Einstein's equation and to specify its stance concerning the "conversion" of mass and energy.
The first property interpretation I wish to consider, which is advocated by physicists and philosophers such as Eddington (1929) and Torretti (1996) , is that
Einstein's equation entails that mass and energy are actually the same property.
According to this interpretation, which I will call the same-property interpretation, mass and energy were hitherto regarded as distinct properties because in Newtonian physics they are, and must be, measured in different units. However, because according to special relativity light travels at the same speed for all inertial observers, one can select units such that spatial intervals are specified in units of time, e.g., light-years. When such units are chosen, energy and mass have the same units and are numerically equal. Hence, mass and energy are not two distinct properties after all. According to Torretti (1996) , the only reason that we ever regarded mass and energy as distinct properties in the first place is that we do not perceive spatiotemporal intervals directly. Instead, we perceive spatial intervals and temporal intervals separately, and we perceive them differently.
This leads us to associate different units to space and time, and hence to mass and energy.
Proponents of the same-property interpretation say little about how one ought to understand the purported "conversion" of mass and energy as a physical process. which one can be converted into the other through some kind of physical transformation.
At best, the "conversion" of mass and energy is a conversion between two kinds of units akin to the conversion from meters to yards. Consequently, I will refer to this interpretation as the same-property, no-conversion interpretation of Einstein's equation to indicate that according to this interpretation mass is not physically transformed into energy (or vice versa). Instead, according to Torretti (1996) , cases where there appears to be a conversion, are really cases where there is a change in the distribution of the one property, call it "mass-energy", among the parts of a physical system. Thus, for example,
when a body appears to radiate energy, special relativity teaches that it is really radiating mass-energy.
The second property interpretation of mass-energy equivalence stands in contrast to the same-property interpretation, for it holds that mass and energy are different properties of physical systems. There are two slightly different versions of this interpretation depending on what one says about the "conversion" of mass and energy.
According to the first version, proposed by Bondi and Spurgin (1987) for them to say "energy contributes to mass" or "the mass of an object depends upon its energy-content" to borrow liberally from Einstein (1905) .
Proponents of the different-properties, conversion interpretation, such as Rindler (1977) , seem to hold that some purported cases of the "conversion" of mass and energy are just as proponents of the different-properties, no-conversion interpretation describe.
For example, energy is not converted into mass when one heats a macroscopic object. In such cases, there is merely a transformation of energy. However, according to the different-properties, conversion interpretation, if we reach a "fundamental" level of matter at which the constituents of matter are philosophical atoms, then at this level there is a "conversion" of mass and energy in the sense that a certain amount of one "disappears" and an equivalent amount of the other "appears." Of course, whether there is such a fundamental level, and hence this sort of "conversion," is not a consequence of E = mc 2 . Einstein's equation merely imposes the restriction that if a certain amount of mass (say) disappears from a physical system, then an equivalent amount of energy must appear in the same physical system. Thus, proponents of the different-properties, conversion interpretation hold that, for example, pair annihilation reactions are genuine cases of mass being converted into energy.
Forthcoming in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
The fourth property interpretation of Einstein's equation I wish to consider also stands against the same-property interpretation. The only proponent of this interpretation of whom I am aware is Lange (2001 Lange ( , 2002 . Like Bondi and Spurgin, Lange develops his interpretation as part of an argument against the same-property interpretation and against the view that mass can be "converted" into energy. According to Lange, mass is a real property of physical systems, since it is Lorentz-invariant. Energy, on the other hand, is not a real property since it is not Lorentz-invariant. Consequently, mass and energy cannot be the same property or measure the same thing since only one of them is real.
The claim that mass is a real property but energy is not places Lange's interpretation in the no-conversion camp. For there can be no physically interesting sense of "conversion" that can accommodate a change from a "real" property to a "non-real" Furthermore, Lange argues that the purported "conversion" of mass and energy is an illusion that arises from a change in our perspective when we shift from analyzing a physical system at a microscopic level to analyzing the same system at a macroscopic level. His argument for this conclusion is similar to Bondi and Spurgin's. If we heat a sample of gas, the heat energy from the source is transformed into kinetic energy of the particles that constitute the gas. However, the heat energy does not become mass. The difference with Lange is that he stops short of saying that energy contributes to mass.
Instead, he concludes that we convert the energy of the constituents of the gas into mass One need not think of mass as a measure of the quantity of matter and of energy as a substance in order to draw ontological conclusions from mass-energy equivalence.
Two noteworthy attempts to draw such conclusions are Einstein and Infeld's (1938) and Zahar's (1989) . These two interpretations are closely related, for both hold that since there is no distinction between mass and energy as properties, and since it is by these properties that we distinguish in classical physics between matter and fields, we can no longer distinguish matter and fields. However, the two interpretations differ on the ontological conclusion they draw from these observations. Zahar's position seems to be that our inability to distinguish between matter and fields suggests that the fundamental stuff of modern physics is a certain "I-know-notwhat," which can manifest itself either as matter or as field. I say that this is what Zahar's position seems to be because Zahar's presentation is somewhat clouded by ambiguities in his use of the terms "mass," "matter," "energy," and "field." For example, Consequently, any challenges faced by the latter will affect the former.
III. Criteria for Interpretations of Einstein's Equation
The familiar goal of philosophical interpretations of physical theories is to answer the question "What would the world be like if this theory were true?" Typically, one assumes, often implicitly, that the answer to such a question satisfies the following additional criteria. First, an interpretation I of a given physical theory T does not appeal 
IV. The Viability of Interpretations of Einstein's Equation
Of the four property interpretations of mass-energy equivalence, the one that faces the most serious challenges, since it fails to satisfy (I3), is Lange's one-property, noconversion interpretation. As we have seen, Lange argues that the rest-mass of a body is a real, objective property, whereas the energy of a body is not. To establish this claim,
Lange makes a fairly simple argument. Lange first invokes, in several places, invariance under the relevant group for a given spacetime theory as a necessary condition for a quantity to represent a "real" feature of nature. For example, Lange says, "a real quantity must be invariant" (2002, p. 206) . In the case of special relativity, Lange uses a simple modus tollens to exclude any non-Lorentz-invariant quantity from the set of quantities that designate "real" properties. Significantly, Lange argues energy is not real because energy, by which he typically means kinetic energy simpliciter, is not Lorentz-invariant.
For Lange, non-Lorentz-invariant quantities fail to be "real" because they fail to represent "the objective facts, on which all inertial frames agree" (2002, p. 209). Non-Lorentzinvariant quantities are tainted with the particular "perspective" of a given inertial frame.
However, Lange uses Lorentz-invariance not only as a necessary condition, but also as a sufficient condition for a quantity to be real. For example, in his discussion of length, Lange states:
Though a body's length differs in different frames, and so is not Lorentzinvariant, a body's length in a given frame is the same in all frames. (This quantity carries its reference to a particular frame along with it, so to speak.) Therefore, this quantity is objectively real (2002, p. 218). 
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227). Energy is not a real property because it is
not Lorentz-invariant. Thus, Lange reaches the core of his one-property interpretation by using Lorentz-invariance as both a necessary and sufficient condition for a property to be real.
Although there is no prima facie problem with relating Lorentz-invariance to the "reality" of quantities, the challenge for Lange is that he does not apply Lorentzinvariance as a sufficient condition uniformly, and he offers no grounds for the nonuniformity he introduces. If, as Lange claims, he is focusing on the equivalence of restmass and rest-energy (2002, pp.224-225) , then he is focusing on the equivalence of two scalar invariants. If invariance is a sufficient condition for a quantity to be real, then restenergy must be a real quantity in precisely the same sense that rest-mass is a real quantity. Furthermore, Lange does not explain why he treats rest-mass differently from rest-energy. Thus, Lange's interpretation seems to fail to satisfy (I3). tempted to say that energy has been "converted" into mass. However, if we analyze the gas at a microscopic level, we see that the only physical process occurring is that the heat energy of the source is being transformed into the kinetic energy of the molecules of the gas. From a microscopic perspective, there is no "conversion" of mass into energy.
Thus, Lange concludes that we "convert" energy into mass when we shift from analyzing a system from the microscopic to the macroscopic level.
That energy is not a real property simply does not seem to enter the argument. It seems Lange's argument could easily be made by someone who believes energy, specifically rest-energy, is a real property. Such an argument would have to include a definition of the rest-mass of the gas sample as a function of the dynamical variables of Lange agrees that when the gas sample is heated, its inertial mass increases.
Where does this additional inertial mass come from? It is as if Lange tried to 'open up the black box' and look inside the gas sample to find the additional mass. When we do this, we do not find that the gas sample contains more matter. We only find that the constituents of the gas sample have an increased amount of energy. Thus, we conclude that the increased energy at the microscopic level somehow manifests itself as inertial mass one level up. However, it does not follow from this that we somehow "converted" energy into mass by shifting perspectives. Even if no human observer examined the sample of gas or even theorized about it, in any interaction where it responds as a single body (e.g., if the container enclosing the gas sample is struck by another object) the gas sample responds with a greater inertial mass after it is heated. Furthermore, if, contra Lange, rest-energy is a real property, then Lange's example is just the kind of example Bondi and Spurgin use to support their no-conversion interpretation: there is no genuine "conversion" of energy into mass. All we have is a transformation of one kind of energy, the heat energy of the source, into another kind of energy, the kinetic energy of the molecules. This additional energy of the constituents of the gas sample contributes to the rest-energy of the gas, and hence, through Einstein's equation, to its rest-mass. Precisely why or how the energy of the constituents of a body contributes to that body's rest-mass is a question to which I shall return in the next section.
Whereas the main challenge to Lange's one-property, no-conversion interpretation comes from (I3), the main challenge to the same-property, no-conversion
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Interpretations 2005 interpretation comes from (I2). As a number of authors have observed, e.g., Rindler
(1977) and Stachel and Torretti (1982) , nothing in special relativity rules out the possibility that there exists matter that cannot radiate all of its mass in the form of energy.
It is consistent with Einstein's equation that there exists a certain kind of matter, call it "exotic matter," all of whose mass is inert, in the sense that it can never be radiated away as energy. To see this one merely needs to observe that the relation that one actually derives from the two postulates of special relativity is that E = (m -q) + K (in units in
K is an additive factor that is routinely set to zero and merely fixes the zero point of energy. The term q is also routinely set to zero. However, setting q to zero involves a hypothesis concerning the nature of matter. Specifically, it amounts to adopting the hypothesis that exotic matter does not exist. Yet, the view that mass and energy are the same property seems to require that we set q to zero, for if there were matter that had mass that was not "convertible" into energy, then it would seem that mass and energy could not be the same property after all. Thus, the same-property, noconversion interpretation of Einstein's equation violates (I2), because it requires that we adopt a hypothesis concerning the nature of matter that lies outside special relativity.
As I observed earlier, the violation of (I2) is not nearly as serious as the violation of (I3), which the same-property interpretation does not violate. In this particular case, all we need for the same-property, no-conversion interpretation to be viable is compelling justification for setting q to zero, as such a hypothesis is clearly consistent with special relativity. The available evidence is of two sorts. On the one hand, we have not yet found any matter for which the value of q is non-zero; we have found no exotic matter.
On the other hand, we have found convincing cases of matter for which q is equal to zero,
Interpretations 2005 for example, in annihilation collisions where the entire mass of the two incoming particles becomes energy. The evidence is compelling, though, of course, not conclusive.
Consequently, if we adhere to our criteria for interpretations of Einstein's equations (I1)-(I3) closely, we must conclude that the same-property interpretation is not a viable interpretation of mass-energy equivalence. If, on the other hand, we are willing to allow one additional hypothesis, which is fairly well-confirmed, then the same-property, noconversion interpretation is viable. Finally, since both of the ontological interpretations I have considered rest on the same-property interpretation, the viability of the former is tied to the viability of the latter. Selecting units in which c = 1 amounts to performing a substitution of variables.
Instead of using coordinates (x, t) 3 we use coordinates (x*, t) where x* = x / c. The variable x* has units of time and it has dimensions of time. When we specify a certain value of x*, we have specified an amount of time. Nevertheless, since x* indicates a distance, and one cannot specify a length using a time without specifying a velocity, we preface the time units of x* with the expression "light," as in "light-years." We are not merely appeasing our jarred intuitions. Instead, by using "light-years" (say), we want to indicate that to recover a distance, i.e., a quantity with dimensions of length, we have to multiply x* times c. Consequently, although x* and t are expressed in the same units, and have the same dimensions, it does not follow that x and t have the same dimensions. To say that "we can measure distance in units of time" is simply to say that there are contingent facts that make it possible to perform the substitution of variables defined by
When we use coordinates (x, t) and standard units, e.g., meters for x and seconds for t, we use three fundamental dimensions in dynamics, viz., length (L), time (T), and 2 , that all physical systems must satisfy. Significantly, special relativity is not a constructive theory, i.e., a theory that describes the behavior of matter by appealing to its constituents. One of the merits of the different-properties, conversion interpretation is that it does not blur this distinction. So, for example, in contrast to
Lange, a proponent of the different-properties, conversion interpretation would not think to try to "open up the black box" to discover how mass is converted into energy. As I have argued elsewhere (Flores, 1999) , principle theories only offer top-down explanations. Consequently, while special relativity might tell us that mass and energy can be converted in certain circumstances in the sense that a certain amount of mass (say) "disappears" and an equivalent amount of energy "appears," it does not tell us why, if the answer we are looking for is an explanation of the behavior of a composite system in terms of its parts. Similarly, while relativity tells us that the energy of the constituents of a system of particles contributes to the mass of the system, it does not tell us why, again if by asking "why?" we mean to find an explanation of an object in terms of its constituents. Principle theories do not afford bottom-up explanations (Flores, 1999 properties, conversion interpretation. The same-property, no-conversion interpretation fails because it makes an illegitimate inference from our ability to express two quantities in the same units to the conclusion that they are therefore the same. Furthermore, I have argued that allowing hypotheses concerning the nature of matter to influence our interpretation of mass-energy equivalence blurs the distinction between Einstein's principle and constructive theories, which if kept separate allows us to understand why mass-energy equivalence only receives a top-down explanation.
